
What is GBT – What is Included in GBT
What is GBT – What is Included in GBT. The General Information Gathering (GBT) system, central to Turkey’s internal security architecture, is not only an indispensable tool for law enforcement but also a complex structure at the heart of legal and social debates. This system is more than just a database; it represents the delicate balance between the state’s duty to ensure public safety and the individual’s fundamental rights, such as the privacy of private life, protection of personal data, and the right to a fair trial. While GBT serves to protect public order by identifying and apprehending individuals subject to judicial or administrative proceedings, its operation, the nature of its legal basis, and its potential impact on individuals’ lives give rise to serious concerns.
Purpose and Roadmap of the Report
The primary purpose of this report is to examine the GBT system from a multifaceted perspective, thoroughly analyzing its legal infrastructure, operational realities, key differences from the judicial record (adli sicil kaydı), and the legal remedies available to individuals. While providing comprehensive answers to fundamental questions such as “What is GBT?”, “What does GBT stand for?”, “What is a GBT inquiry?”, and “What appears in a GBT check?”, the report will also subject the topic to an expert-level analysis, exploring its constitutional and human rights dimensions. It will offer the reader a holistic view, from the system’s architecture to debates on its legal legitimacy, and from the content of a GBT record to the complex processes for its deletion.
Chapter 1: Defining the GBT System: Its Architecture and Purpose
1.1. What is GBT? Abbreviation and Core Function
GBT is the abbreviation for “Genel Bilgi Toplama,” which translates to “General Information Gathering.” Its core function is to serve as a central database system that allows for instant inquiries to identify individuals subject to judicial or administrative restrictions, such as arrest warrants, detention orders, or international travel bans. The primary goal of the system is to enable law enforcement officers to determine within seconds whether a person they have stopped is wanted by judicial authorities, thereby ensuring public safety and order.
1.2. Institutional Framework: A Joint Security Apparatus
The GBT system is not owned by a single institution but is a unified apparatus used jointly by the main internal security units under the Ministry of Interior. These units are the General Directorate of Security (Police), the Gendarmerie General Command, the Coast Guard Command, and the Undersecretariat of Customs.
This institutional structure represents a significant centralization of the state’s security data. Although each institution has its own jurisdiction and duties (urban, rural, coastal), GBT provides a common data pool, ensuring a seamless flow of information among these units. For example, an arrest warrant entered into the system by a police unit in Istanbul can be instantly viewed by a gendarmerie unit conducting a road check in a rural part of Anatolia. While this centralization increases the state’s effectiveness in apprehending wanted persons, it also consolidates a vast amount of sensitive personal data into a single, powerful tool. This situation exponentially increases the system’s scope and potential for misuse compared to data being held in silos within individual institutions.
Chapter 2: Legal Framework: Authority, Legitimacy, and Constitutional Oversight
2.1. The Primary Legal Instrument: The KİHBİ Directive
The main legal text regulating the operation of the GBT system is the “Smuggling, Intelligence, Operation, Information Gathering” (KİHBİ) Directive. However, this directive is also the source of the most fundamental debates regarding the system’s legitimacy. The directive has a “For Official Use Only” confidentiality classification, has not been published in the Official Gazette, and is therefore not publicly accessible.
This unpublished directive, which forms the basis of the GBT system, creates a serious conflict with the “principle of legality,” one of the fundamental tenets of law. This cornerstone of the rule of law requires that laws be public, accessible, and predictable. Interferences with fundamental rights, such as the privacy of private life and the protection of personal data guaranteed by Article 20 of the Constitution, must be based on “law.” According to the established jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, “law” refers only to a regulation passed by parliament that is clear, accessible, and whose consequences are foreseeable. An unpublished directive used internally by an administrative unit does not meet this standard. Indeed, in a ruling finding a violation, the Constitutional Court pointed to this very issue, deeming the lack of an adequate “legal basis” for records in the GBT system a violation of the right to privacy of private life guaranteed under Article 20 of the Constitution. This reveals not just a procedural deficiency but a systemic legitimacy problem at the core of the system.
2.2. Authority to Inquire: The Police Duties and Powers Act (PVSK)
The legal basis for law enforcement officers to stop a person, ask for identification, and consequently conduct a GBT inquiry is Article 4/A of the Police Duties and Powers Act (PVSK), Law No. 2559. This article grants the police the “authority to stop” under certain conditions. These conditions include purposes such as preventing the commission of a crime, apprehending a perpetrator who has fled after committing a crime, or identifying a suspect.
The law stipulates that for this authority to be exercised, there must be a “reasonable cause” based on the police officer’s professional experience and the impression gained from the situation at hand. It also explicitly prohibits stop procedures that are continuous, arbitrary, or amount to de facto harassment.
2.3. Constitutional Objections and Human Rights Implications
The GBT system constitutes a significant interference with fundamental rights, primarily the right to respect for private life, protected by Article 20 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The collection, storage, and processing of such a wide range of personal data is a serious intrusion upon this right.
Legal institutions like the Istanbul Bar Association have argued that the widespread and arbitrary application of GBT checks can constitute degrading and humiliating treatment, restrict freedom of travel, and violate the right to liberty and security of person. Practices such as conducting GBT inquiries on 336,000 people in a single operation highlight the scale of this practice and its potential for human rights violations. The aforementioned violation ruling by the Constitutional Court also confirmed that the system’s lack of a clear, accessible, and predictable legal framework directly constitutes a violation of Article 20 of the Constitution.
Chapter 3: The Content of a GBT Record: What Information is Stored?
3.1. Comparative Analysis: GBT vs. Judicial Record
Two of the most commonly confused concepts among citizens are the GBT record and the Judicial Record (Adli Sicil Kaydı). These two systems are fundamentally different in both their purpose and content. The key distinction is that GBT is a process-oriented security record, whereas the Judicial Record is a result-orientedjudicial record.
This distinction means that GBT contains information about ongoing legal processes, such as active arrest warrants, pending criminal cases (derdest kovuşturma), or judicial control orders. In contrast, the Judicial Record only contains final conviction judgments issued by courts, i.e., the final result of a legal process. Therefore, a person can have a “clean” judicial record because they have not been convicted of any crime, but still have a GBT record due to an ongoing investigation or an arrest warrant. This has profound consequences; the GBT system can label an individual as a security risk based merely on suspicion or a pending case, even before their guilt has been legally proven. This has the potential to undermine the presumption of innocence, blurring the line between accusation and conviction.
Table 1: Comparison of GBT Record and Judicial Record
The following table summarizes the key differences between these two systems:
| Feature | GBT (General Information Gathering) | Judicial Record |
| Legal Basis | KİHBİ Directive (Confidential) | Law No. 5352 on Judicial Records (Public Law) |
| Data Controller | Ministry of Interior (Police, Gendarmerie) | Ministry of Justice |
| Scope of Information | Arrest warrants, pending cases, international travel bans, judicial control orders, missing persons, military status, etc. | Only final conviction judgments and security measures |
| Purpose of Use | Instant law enforcement activity, identification of wanted persons, security checks | Official confirmation of criminal history for employment, license applications, etc. |
| Citizen Access | Indirect; via petition to the Governorship/District Governorship or an application under the LPPD | Direct; via the e-Government portal or courthouses |
| Deletion Criteria | Complex; depends on the type of crime and case outcome. Often requires active legal follow-up by the individual | Automatic or upon application when legal conditions are met (e.g., expiration of a time period) |
3.2. Data Categories in the GBT System
The information that can emerge from a GBT inquiry is compiled from various sources and can be categorized as follows:
- Personal Identification Information: Name, surname, T.R. identity number, date and place of birth.
- Judicial Decisions: Active arrest warrants, in absentia detention orders, and international travel bans.
- Ongoing Legal Proceedings: Information regarding pending criminal prosecutions (derdest davalar) against the person.
- Judicial Control Measures: Judicial control measures such as the obligation for a person to sign in at a police station. In this case, a “TEDBİR” (Measure) warning appears in the GBT inquiry.
- Status Information: Status information such as missing person records, individuals banned from public service, and military deserters.
- Property Records: Information on stolen or lost firearms, motor vehicles, and identification documents.
3.3. The Critical Distinction: Offenses Under Article 9/b of the Directive
Offenses listed under Article 9/b of the KİHBİ Directive, which are considered more serious, form a special category within the GBT system. These offenses cover a wide spectrum, including terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling, sexual assault, and crimes against the state.
This distinction lays the groundwork for the creation of a permanent security record. The system treats individuals accused of offenses under Article 9/b differently, creating a permanent record that is much more difficult to delete. For ordinary offenses, the information form in the GBT is generally “destroyed” once the person is apprehended. However, when a person wanted for a crime under Article 9/b is caught, the record is not destroyed; the status is merely changed from “WANTED” to “APPREHENDED,” and the file is “classified” (archived). More importantly, even if the person is acquitted of the charge, the record is still not destroyed but only “canceled” and remains in the archive. It is even stated that in the case of a conviction, the record is not deleted until the person’s death. This creates a two-tiered system in the digital memory: the system can forget minor accusations, but it permanently remembers serious ones (even if they later prove to be unfounded). This creates a permanent “suspect” file that can follow an individual throughout their life, negatively affecting future security clearances and interactions with the state.
Chapter 4: The Practice of GBT Inquiry: Procedures and Citizen Rights
4.1. Common Scenarios for GBT Inquiries
Typical situations where citizens encounter a GBT check include:
- Routine traffic stops (Road Checks).
- Security screenings at airports, border crossings, and customs.
- General identity checks in public spaces such as squares, entertainment venues, or public transport.
- Checks conducted at a crime scene as part of a criminal investigation.
4.2. Rights and Obligations During a GBT Check
When asked for identification by a law enforcement officer who meets the “reasonable cause” standard under PVSK Article 4/A, it is a legal obligation to present a valid identification document. However, citizens also have rights. Chief among these is the right to be informed of the reason for being stopped. Additionally, individuals have the right not to be subjected to checks that are not based on reasonable suspicion and are arbitrary, continuous, or harassing in nature.
4.3. Legal Remedies Against Unlawful Inquiries
It is possible to take legal action against irregular or arbitrary GBT checks. This may include filing an official complaint against the relevant law enforcement unit. An application can be made to the Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey on the grounds that such actions constitute a violation of fundamental rights, or an individual application can be made to the Constitutional Court after exhausting domestic remedies. It should also be remembered that being subjected to continuous and unjustified checks can be considered “degrading, humiliating, and ill-treatment.”
Chapter 5: Managing a GBT Record: Access, Correction, and Deletion
5.1. How to Find Out Your GBT Status
There is no direct e-Government service for an individual to find out if they have a GBT record. However, it is possible to obtain this information through indirect means:
- Method 1: Official Petition: An application can be made with an official petition addressed to the Governorships in provinces or District Governorships in districts. This petition is forwarded to the relevant local Police or Gendarmerie Information Gathering Units for a response.
- Method 2: Law on the Protection of Personal Data (LPPD): Under Article 11 of the LPPD (Law No. 6698), every individual has the right to apply to the General Directorate of Security to request information about the personal data processed about them. This application can be made in writing or through a notary.
5.2. The Legal Process for Record Deletion
The deletion of a GBT record is a complex process that varies depending on the nature of the offense that led to the record being created.
- For Offenses Not Covered by Article 9/b of the Directive: The process is simpler. When the person is apprehended or a decision of non-prosecution (kovuşturmaya yer olmadığına dair karar – KYOK) is issued, the relevant information form is usually destroyed.
- For Offenses Covered by Article 9/b of the Directive: The process is extremely difficult. The record is not destroyed but archived. To have the record deleted, a final court decision such as an acquittal, dismissal of the case, or a ruling that there is no ground for punishment is required. Decisions such as amnesty, parole, or the conversion of a sentence to a fine do not lead to the deletion of the record.
This process reveals a structure where the burden of correction is placed entirely on the citizen’s shoulders. The GBT system does not automatically correct its own errors or outdated records. Even an individual who receives a favorable outcome, such as an acquittal, does not have their record automatically deleted. The citizen must first obtain the final court decision, then apply to the relevant unit of the Ministry of Interior with a petition attaching this decision. If the ministry does not comply with this request, the citizen’s only recourse is to file a lawsuit for annulment against the ministry in an Administrative Court to have the record deleted. This situation places individuals under a significant bureaucratic and financial burden to have their legal innocence recognized in official records.
5.3. The Role of Legal Counsel
Given the complexity of the record deletion process, seeking assistance from a lawyer specializing in administrative law is of great importance. An expert lawyer can ensure that petitions are prepared correctly, necessary documents are obtained completely, and legal deadlines are not missed, thereby significantly increasing the likelihood of a successful outcome.
Chapter 6: The Widespread Effects of a GBT Record
6.1. Impact on Employment: Public Sector Security Clearances
One of the most tangible and devastating effects of a GBT record emerges during employment processes in the public sector. GBT records are a significant data source in the “Security Investigation and Archive Research” process, which is mandatory for appointment to many public positions.
This process can turn into a mechanism of “preventive punishment.” Security investigations examine not only the judicial record, which contains only final convictions, but a much broader range of information. Information in the GBT system that did not result in a conviction (dismissed cases, non-prosecution decisions, ongoing trials) can be seen by the authorities conducting the investigation. Therefore, a GBT record related to a case that ended in acquittal can cause a person’s security investigation to be concluded as “negative,” thus preventing their appointment to public office. This means that an individual who has been cleared by the judicial system is de facto punished or professionally blocked by an administrative action (the security investigation). This openly contradicts the presumption of innocence, one of the most fundamental principles of law. A GBT record can remain as a permanent stain, hindering employment even if the justice system clears the individual.
6.2. The Chilling Effect: Social and Personal Consequences
The pervasiveness of the GBT system creates a broader impact on society. The concern of being “fişlenme” (unofficially profiled or labeled by the state), feeds the fear that any contact with the justice system will leave a permanent mark.
The fear of having a permanent GBT record may cause citizens to refrain from exercising their constitutional rights, such as the right to assembly and demonstration. The risk of having a record created about them after an identity check during a police intervention can create a “chilling effect” on the exercise of these rights. The prevalence of GBT checks has the potential to create a climate of suspicion, eroding the sense of personal freedom and privacy that is the foundation of a democratic society.
Conclusion: The Balance Between Security and Freedom
Summary of Key Findings
As this report has demonstrated, the GBT system is a powerful tool for law enforcement whose effectiveness is built upon a fragile legal foundation. There is a deep tension between the system’s goal of ensuring public safety and its practices, which carry the potential to violate fundamental rights such as the privacy of private life, the protection of personal data, and the right to a fair trial. At the core of this tension lies the fact that the system’s legal basis is a non-public directive, the processes for record deletion are difficult, and the system can be used in a way that undermines the presumption of innocence.
Call for Legislative Reform
In conclusion, a comprehensive legislative reform to bring the GBT system within constitutional limits is an urgent necessity. This reform should replace the confidential KİHBİ Directive with a public and transparent law enacted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. This new law must clearly define the scope and purpose of data collection, set firm rules on how long data can be stored, establish automatic and clear deletion mechanisms, and provide for an independent oversight mechanism to monitor the system’s operation.
Final Recommendations for Citizens
For citizens, the recommendations are as follows: understanding the difference between a GBT record and a judicial record, knowing their rights during a police check, and being prepared to proactively take legal steps to have incorrect or outdated records deleted are essential for protecting individual rights in the face of this complex system. What is GBT – What is Included in GBT.