7 Soruda Sendikal Faaliyetlerde İşçi Haklarının Korunması

7 Questions About Protecting Workers’ Rights in Union Activities


7 Questions About Protecting Workers’ Rights in Union Activities. Within the dynamics of working life, union organization is not only a means of protecting economic interests but also one of the cornerstones of establishing a democratic social order and social justice. The individual weakness of the worker against capital can only be balanced through the effective use of collective rights. In Turkey, the protection of union rights is built upon a complex legal ground woven hierarchically by international conventions, the Constitution, the Law No. 6356 on Trade Unions and Collective Labour Agreements, and the Labour Law No. 4857. However, the existence of normative regulations is not always sufficient to prevent rights violations in practice; at this point, judicial precedents, doctrinal debates, and actual struggles in the field become decisive. This report aims to examine the protection of worker rights in union activities across a wide spectrum ranging from the theoretical infrastructure of the legislation to trial procedures, burden of proof, compensation regimes, and current socio-legal developments, revolving around seven fundamental questions. The analysis will focus not only on the question “what does the law say” but also on “how is the law applied and what are the structural problems of the system,” thereby revealing the living face of labor law.

Question 1: What are the Legal Bases of Union Rights, the Hierarchy of Norms, and the Impact of International Conventions on Domestic Law?

The protection of union rights has ceased to be an area left solely to the discretion of the legislator in modern legal systems and has become an integral part of the universal human rights regime. The analysis of union guarantees in Turkish labor law requires a holistic reading of regulations that start from the top of the hierarchy of norms and descend downwards, complementing and occasionally conflicting with each other. This structure is shaped by the principle of the constitutional supremacy of international conventions and plays a decisive role in the interpretation of local legislation.

1.1. International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions and Supremacy of Norms

To understand the spirit of the legislation regulating working life in Turkey, it is essential to first look at the founding principles of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the fundamental conventions ratified by Turkey. ILO norms are not merely recommendations; they are texts that become part of domestic law upon ratification and have a binding force superior to laws pursuant to Article 90 of the Constitution.

In particular, the Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise serves as the constitution of union rights. This convention guarantees the right of workers and employers to establish organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization and without distinction. While emphasizing the state’s obligation not to interfere (negative status), the convention also imposes on the state the obligation to provide the necessary environment for the effective use of the right to organize (positive status). Turkey’s ratification of this convention has caused domestic union restrictions (such as the condition of not having been convicted of certain crimes for union founders) to be constantly criticized by ILO supervisory bodies. This is because Convention No. 87 considers restrictive interference by the administration or laws regarding the election of union officials as contrary to freedom of association.

Furthermore, the Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargainingis the cornerstone of protection against anti-union discrimination. This convention commands the establishment of effective protection mechanisms against the risk of workers not being employed, being dismissed, or being subjected to discrimination in any way due to union reasons. The concept of “union compensation” in Turkish law is directly rooted in the requirements of this convention. Convention specifically mandates the existence of deterrent sanctions against the termination of employment contracts due to union membership.

The new dimension gained by Article 90 of the Constitution with the amendment made in 2004 has radically changed the applicability of ILO conventions. The provision stating that “In case of a conflict between international agreements regarding fundamental rights and freedoms duly put into effect and the laws due to different provisions on the same matter, the provisions of the international agreement shall prevail” gives judges the authority and duty to apply ILO Conventions 87 and 98 directly in cases where Law No. 6356 is interpreted narrowly or remains insufficient. For instance, strict prohibitions imposed by local legislation regarding the scope of the right to strike are being stretched by the Constitutional Court in light of the ILO Supervisory Bodies’ jurisprudence that “the right to strike is an inseparable part of freedom of association.” This necessitates handling union rights not only with literal interpretation but with purposeful interpretation in accordance with international standards.

1.2. Constitutional Framework and Positive Obligations of the State

The 1982 Constitution regulates union rights in the “Social and Economic Rights and Duties” section. However, recent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court evaluates these rights not merely as classical social rights, but in a status connected with political and civil rights, which are essential elements of a democratic society.

Article 51 of the Constitution, regulating the “Right to Organize Unions,” states that employees and employers have the right to form unions and higher organizations without obtaining prior permission in order to protect and develop their economic and social rights and interests in their labor relations. The phrase “without obtaining prior permission” in the article limits the administration’s audit authority during the union establishment process to a formal review. Additionally, the freedom to join and withdraw from a union is guaranteed in the same article. This regulation covers both “positive union freedom” (joining a union and engaging in activities) and “negative union freedom” (not joining a union or resigning from one).

Article 53 of the Constitution regulates the right to collective bargaining, and Article 54regulates the right to strike. Although the constitutional framer recognized the right to strike, they drew the boundaries of the right with the security-oriented paradigm of 1982 by prohibiting actions such as “politically motivated strikes, solidarity strikes, general strikes, and workplace occupations.” However, the Constitutional Court tries to align these prohibitions with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in cases brought before it through individual application. In particular, the rejection of the “rights strike” concept and the confinement of strikes only to disputes in the collective bargaining process (interest strike) is a subject of constitutional debate. The Constitutional Court emphasizes that in case of obstruction of union activities, the state has a “positive obligation” not only to “not cast a shadow” but also to establish effective legal and administrative mechanisms to protect the worker against employer pressure.

1.3. Innovations and Limitations Introduced by the Law No. 6356 on Trade Unions and Collective Labour Agreements

Enacted in 2012, Law No. 6356 replaced the old laws No. 2821 and 2822, gathering union legislation under a single roof. The general rationale of the Law was presented as removing obstacles to union organization and harmonizing legislation with ILO norms.

The most revolutionary regulation of the Law is the removal of the notary requirement for union membership and resignation, allowing transactions to be made via the e-Government system. This change technically reduced the risk of workers being exposed to employer pressure while joining a union (obligation to go to a notary, need to take leave from work, cost, etc.). However, digitalization has brought along new generation pressure methods, such as employers demanding workers’ e-Government passwords to check their membership status.

Article 25 of Law No. 6356, under the title “Guarantee of freedom of association,” is the fundamental norm prohibiting discrimination against workers due to union reasons during recruitment, working conditions, and termination of employment processes. The Law also continues to seek the condition of not having been convicted of certain crimes in the Turkish Penal Code (embezzlement, extortion, bribery, etc.) when determining the conditions sought for union foundership. This situation is in tension with the ILO principle of “members freely electing union officials”; as restricting the right to vote and be elected regardless of the nature of the conviction can be seen as an intervention in freedom of association.

The model of organization based on the branch of activity is another pillar of Law No. 6356. The Law states that unions shall be established according to the branch of activity and that auxiliary works in a workplace are also counted within the branch of activity of the main work. This situation prevents workplace-type organization or craft unionism, maintaining the centralist structure of the Turkish union system indexed to the branch threshold (currently 1%). The branch threshold de facto restricts union pluralism by taking away the authority of small unions to make collective agreements.

Legal SourceBasic Function and ContentEffect and Bindingness in Practice
ILO Convention No. 87It is the fundamental constitution of the freedom to form and join unions. Rejects the permission requirement.Superior to laws per Constitution Art. 90. Authorizes judges to overcome restrictions in domestic law.
ILO Convention No. 98Protects the right to organize and collective bargaining. It is the basis of the prohibition of discrimination.It is the basis of the “union termination” concept in union compensation and reinstatement lawsuits.
Constitution (Arts. 51-54)Includes union rights in the catalog of fundamental rights and freedoms. Regulates Strike and CLA rights.Creates positive obligation for the state; criterion for auditing the constitutionality of laws.
Law No. 6356Details the establishment, operation, authorization processes, and guarantees of unions.It is the basic text of practice. Determines e-Government membership, 1% threshold, and union compensation amounts.
Labour Law No. 4857Regulates the validity and consequences of termination within the scope of job security (Arts. 18-21).The procedure for union termination, reinstatement lawsuit process, and general compensation regime are subject to this law.

Question 2: Which Stages of the Employment Relationship Does the Prohibition of Anti-Union Discrimination Cover and What is the Nature of Prohibited Actions?

The prohibition of anti-union discrimination is the sharpest appearance of the “equal treatment obligation” principle of labor law specific to union rights. Article 25 of Law No. 6356 absolutely forbids the employer from treating the worker differently due to union preferences. This protection does not start with the establishment of the employment relationship; it comes into play from the moment the worker applies for the job, continues during employment, and is completed with the termination of the employment relationship (and even subsequent reference processes).

2.1. “Yellow Dog” Prohibition at the Recruitment Stage

The employer’s freedom of recruitment is limited by union reasons. Employment contracts known in legal literature as “Yellow Dog Contracts,” which depend on the condition that the worker will not join a union, will resign from current membership, or will join a specific union (usually a union under employer control) upon entering the job, are invalid in Turkish law.

The legislator has prohibited three basic behaviors in recruitment:

  1. Condition of joining or not joining a specific union: The employer cannot say to the candidate, “If you want to work here, you cannot be a member of Union X.”
  2. Condition of maintaining or withdrawing membership in a specific union: The employer cannot say, “I will hire you, but resign from the union at your old workplace.”
  3. Condition of not being a member of any union: A general de-unionization policy cannot be pursued.

However, the biggest problem at this stage is the problem of proof. How will a worker candidate prove that they were eliminated in the interview because they were a union member? Employers generally put forward subjective reasons such as “competence,” “compatibility,” or “full staff” as reasons for rejection. In Court of Cassation practice, if the worker proves this situation with witnesses, e-mail correspondence, or questions asked during the interview (e.g., questions like “What is your view on unions?”), the act of not hiring can be evaluated within the scope of tort or violation of the rule of honesty (Turkish Civil Code Art. 2) and compensation can be awarded. Law No. 6356 did not foresee a special “union compensation” (at least 1 year’s wage) for recruitment discrimination; however, material and moral compensation can be claimed according to general provisions.

2.2. Discrimination in Working Conditions and Execution of Work

After the employment relationship is established, the employer cannot discriminate between workers regarding working conditions, wages, bonuses, premiums, social benefits, leave usage, and promotion due to union reasons. The Law mandates: “Workers shall not be dismissed or subjected to different treatment because of their membership or non-membership in a union, their participation in the activities of worker organizations outside working hours or within working hours with the employer’s permission, or their engagement in union activities.”

Typology of Prohibited Actions:

  • Discrimination in Wages and Fringe Benefits: Not giving raises to unionized workers, cutting their premiums, or making additional payments under the name of “loyalty premium” only to non-union workers.
  • Aggravation of Working Conditions: Systematically driving union members to the most difficult, dirtiest sections or sections with the highest occupational health and safety risks.
  • Mobbing and Psychological Pressure: Isolating unionized workers, preventing them from talking to other workers during lunch breaks, constantly keeping minutes.
  • Overtime Practices: Constantly writing overtime for unionized workers for punishment purposes or, conversely, giving no overtime at all to deprive them of overtime pay.

A critical distinction here is differences originating from Collective Labour Agreements (CLA). If there is an authorized union in the workplace and it has signed a CLA, the fact that the wages of unionized workers benefiting from the CLA are higher than those of non-union workers is not “discrimination” but a natural result of the union order. The purpose of the CLA order is already to provide benefits to members. What is prohibited is the employer creating a difference against the unionized worker by using initiative for the purpose of de-unionization.

2.3. Discrimination at the Termination Stage and Termination for Union Reasons

The area where protection is most concentrated and 90% of disputes are gathered is the termination stage. The employer cannot terminate the employment contract due to the worker’s union activities. If it is determined that the termination is based on a union reason, the employer faces very heavy financial sanctions.

Situations Considered Union Termination:

  • Dismissal of “pioneer workers” as soon as it is heard that union organization has started.
  • Mass layoffs made just before or after the application for a certificate of competence.
  • Dismissal of the worker due to being a candidate for union representative or being elected.
  • Termination due to participation in union actions (distributing leaflets, holding meetings within legal limits, etc.).

According to the established jurisprudence of the 9th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in cases where the reasons shown by the employer for termination such as “poor performance,” “economic crisis,” or “worker’s behavior” are understood to be actually a screening (mask) and the real reason is union activity, the termination is qualified as “union termination.”


Question 3: What is the Legal Nature of Union Compensation, How is its Amount Calculated, and What is the Current Judicial Precedent Regarding its Taxation?

Union compensation is a type of compensation in Turkish labor law that is distinct from job security compensation, has a unique character, and in which the “civil penalty” (punitive damages) function predominates. Its purpose is to punish and deter the employer who violates a constitutional right, rather than merely compensating the damage suffered by the worker.

3.1. The “Minimum One Year’s Wage” Rule and Calculation Method

According to Article 25, paragraph 4 of Law No. 6356; if it is determined that the employment contract was terminated for a union reason, the worker becomes entitled to union compensation regardless of their application or whether they are reinstated or not. The Law has determined the amount of this compensation with an imperative language as “cannot be less than the worker’s one-year wage amount.”

This regulation determines the lower limit of compensation. Considering elements such as the worker’s seniority, the intensity of union activity, and the weight of the employer’s bad faith, the judge can increase this amount; but cannot reduce it below one year’s wage. For example, when a 20-year worker and a 1-month worker are dismissed for a union reason, both receive compensation of at least 1 year’s wage. This shows that union compensation is not a classical compensation based on seniority.

Which Wage is Taken as Basis? The wage to be taken into account in the calculation is the worker’s last bare gross wage on the date the employment contract was terminated. The “dressed wage,” which includes additional payments such as bonuses, premiums, fuel aid, food money, is not taken as a basis; the basic gross salary appearing on the worker’s payroll is used. Established decisions of the Court of Cassation General Assembly of Civil Chambers and the 9th Civil Chamber are in this direction. The calculation over the gross wage makes the compensation amount a serious financial burden for the employer. However, the parties can increase this amount via Collective Labour Agreement (CLA) or individual employment contract; for example, a clause stating “union compensation is 24 months’ wage” can be added.

3.2. Independence and Cumulative Structure of Compensation

Union compensation is completely independent of the “compensation for not starting work” regulated in Article 21 of Labour Law No. 4857.

  • No Condition of Reinstatement: In normal reinstatement lawsuits, compensation arises if the worker applies and the employer does not reinstate them. In union compensation, even if the employer reinstates the worker, they are obliged to pay this compensation due to the unfair termination action in the past. Union compensation becomes due upon the determination that the termination was based on a “union reason.”
  • No Seniority Condition: While 6 months of seniority is required for job security compensation, it is sufficient for the worker to have worked for 1 day in the workplace for union compensation.

3.3. Taxation Issue: Gross or Net?

The taxation of union compensation has been a subject of debate between doctrine and the judiciary for many years. According to the Income Tax Law, payments in the nature of wages are subject to tax, and old decisions of the Court of Cassation stated that income tax should be deducted from union compensation. This situation caused the money received by the worker to decrease by approximately 15% to 35%.

However, in 2023 and 2024, a significant change in jurisprudence occurred in Regional Courts of Justice and Court of Cassation decisions. The 2023 decision of the 9th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation (E. 2023/6357), which resolved the conflict between regional courts of justice, ruled that union compensation should also be evaluated within the scope of job security compensation and should be exempt from income tax. The rationale for the decision is that this compensation is compensation for the damage suffered by the worker due to unemployment and is part of job security. This current development has paved the way for workers to receive their compensation as a net figure very close to the gross amount (with only stamp duty deduction). As of the date this report was written, this jurisprudence is the strongest gain in favor of the worker.


Question 4: Who Bears the Burden of Proof in Union Termination Lawsuits and How is the Concept of “Strong Indication” (Presumption) Applied in Adjudication?

The general rule in civil procedure law is the principle “Müddei iddiasını ispatla mükelleftir” (The claimant is obliged to prove their claim). However, due to the principle of protecting the worker in labor law, the burden of proof has shifted in termination lawsuits. The burden of proving that the termination was based on a valid reason lies with the employer. But when the subject is “union reason,” the mechanism becomes more complex.

4.1. Distribution of Burden of Proof: Transition from Worker to Employer

Pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 6 of Law No. 6356; “In a lawsuit opened with the allegation that the employment contract was terminated for a union reason, the obligation to prove the reason for termination belongs to the employer. The worker who claims that the termination is not based on the reason put forward by the employer is obliged to prove that the termination was based on a union reason.”

This article may seem contradictory at first glance. In practice, the process works as follows:

  1. Stage: The employer claims that they dismissed the worker due to, for example, “poor performance.” The employer must first prove this poor performance (minutes, targets, etc.).
  2. Stage: If the employer cannot prove poor performance, the termination is deemed “invalid” and reinstatement is decided.
  3. Stage (Critical Point): If the worker claims “He fired me not because of performance, but because I am a union member” and demands union compensation, they must prove this claim. Because union compensation is a heavier result than normal reinstatement, and the claimant (worker) requesting this heavy result must prove its basis.

However, recognizing the impossibility of the worker proving the employer’s “intention in their inner world” (motive) with direct evidence, the Court of Cassation has developed the “Presumption of Union Termination” (Strong Indication) principle.

4.2. Criteria for Strong Indication (Presumption of Union Termination)

The 22nd and 9th Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation accept that even if the worker cannot directly prove the union reason, if they present “strong indications” showing that the termination was based on a union reason according to the ordinary course of life, the burden of proof shifts back to the employer. In this case, the employer must prove “with a certainty that leaves no doubt in judgment” that the termination was not based on a union reason.

Strong Indications Accepted in Court of Cassation Jurisprudence:

  • Chronological Harmony (Timing): Proximity between the date the worker joined the union or the date the union applied to the Ministry for authorization determination and the date of dismissal. For example, dismissal of the worker 3 days after the union applied for authorization.
  • Simultaneous Mass Layoffs: Dismissal of multiple workers simultaneously or at short intervals with similar (or abstract) reasons during a period when union organization intensified in the workplace.
  • Union/Non-Union Distinction: If workers are being dismissed with the claim of economic contraction, the fact that all or the vast majority of those dismissed are union members, while non-union workers or those who resigned from the union continue to work.
  • Rehiring of Those Who Resigned: Rehiring of a dismissed worker upon their resignation from the union or their continuation of work without being dismissed. This situation is the clearest proof of union termination, like “cigarette smoke.”
  • Witness Statements: Consistent statements of other employees in the workplace that managers made threats like “We won’t harbor union members,” “Resign or lose your job.”
  • Camera Records and Minutes: Situations where moments of the worker conducting union activities (distributing leaflets, etc.) were watched by the employer and the termination process was carried out immediately after.

4.3. Cases Where Proof Fails and Current Decisions

Not every dismissal of a unionized worker is a union termination. The Court of Cassation stipulates that it must be proven that the employer knew the worker was a union member. If the worker joined secretly via e-Government and did not inform the employer, and the employer did not receive an authorization determination letter from the union, the claim that “they terminated for a reason they did not know” is not accepted.

Current Example: In a 2025 decision of the Izmir Regional Court of Justice (E. 2025/268), the demand for union compensation was rejected on the grounds that there was already a Collective Labour Agreement (CLA) in the plaintiff worker’s workplace, the employer recognized the union, therefore it was illogical to commit union hostility; and also because the worker could not prove a concrete union activity. This decision shows that the judiciary acts more meticulously to prevent terminations arising from individual disciplinary offenses in unionized workplaces from being put into the guise of “union termination.”


Question 5: How Does the Technical Relationship Between Reinstatement Lawsuit and Union Compensation Work, and How Does the 30 Workers/6 Months Seniority Exception Operate?

When workers are dismissed for union reasons, they usually file both a reinstatement lawsuit and claim union compensation. The relationship between these two institutions is the most technical subject of Turkish Labor Law, harboring the largest exceptions in favor of the worker.

5.1. Elimination of Job Security Conditions

Under normal conditions, pursuant to Article 18 of Labour Law No. 4857, there are two basic prerequisites for a worker to benefit from job security (the right to file a reinstatement lawsuit):

  1. At least 30 workers must be employed in the workplace.
  2. The worker must have at least 6 months of seniority.

However, when the subject is union termination, these limiting conditions disappear. Article 25 of Law No. 6356 and Court of Cassation precedents accept that due to the principle of supremacy of union rights, in terminations made for union reasons, the worker can file a union compensation lawsuit even if their seniority is 1 day or even if only 1 worker works in the workplace.

This exception is of vital importance. Because union organization is generally tried to be prevented in small enterprises or during periods when workers have just started work (have not completed 6 months). If the 6-month condition had been sought, employers could have achieved de-unionization by dismissing unionized workers in the 5th month without facing any sanctions. The legislator closed this gap for union terminations. If the worker has not completed 6 months, even if they cannot demand “reinstatement” (under Labour Law Art. 20), they can demand “union compensation” and bad faith compensation. However, in light of Constitutional Court decisions, a strong legal opinion and judicial tendency have formed that workers whose 6 months have not been completed can also file a reinstatement lawsuit in case of union termination.

5.2. Competition of Compensations: Which One is Paid?

If the court decides that termination for a union reason has occurred, the judgment clause is established as follows:

  1. Invalidity of Termination and Reinstatement: Reinstatement of the worker is decided.
  2. Wage for Idle Time: It is ruled that wages and other rights for the period from the date the worker was dismissed until the finalization of the decision (up to a maximum of 4 months) be paid.
  3. Union Compensation: Compensation in the amount of at least 1 year’s gross wage that must be paid whether the worker is reinstated or not.

Critical Difference: In a normal reinstatement lawsuit, if the employer does not reinstate the worker, they pay 4-8 months of “compensation for not starting work.” However, in a union termination lawsuit, since union compensation (at least 12 months) is awarded, a separate 4-8 months compensation for not starting work is not awarded. Union compensation covers and swallows the compensation for not starting work. That is, the worker cannot say “let me get both union compensation (12 months) and compensation for not starting work (8 months).” The Court of Cassation is of the opinion that “Union compensation includes compensation for not starting work” to prevent double payment. However, the worker receives union compensation even if they are reinstated; whereas in a normal lawsuit, they cannot receive compensation if reinstated. This is the most obvious indication of the “penalty” nature of union compensation.

Summary Table: Normal Termination vs. Union Termination Results

CriterionNormal Invalid Termination (Job Security)Termination for Union Reason
Seniority ConditionAt least 6 monthsNo condition (1 day is sufficient)
Workplace SizeAt least 30 workersNo condition
Compensation for Not Starting Work4-8 months (Paid only if not reinstated)None (Union Compensation takes its place)
Union CompensationNoneAt least 12 months (Paid whether reinstated or not)
Wage for Idle TimeMax 4 monthsMax 4 months
Burden of ProofEmployer (Valid reason)Worker (Union reason / Strong Indication)

Question 6: What are the Differences Between the Guarantees of Workplace Union Representatives and Normal Members?

Workplace union representatives (representative and head representative), who are the nerve endings of union organization in the workplace, are at risk because they deal directly with the employer. For this reason, Law No. 6356 envisages a protection regime (Art. 24) for representatives that is much superior to normal members, approaching the level of “immunity.”

6.1. “Just Cause” Necessity for Termination and Requirement of Writing

The employment contract of a normal worker (even if a union member) can be terminated for “valid reasons” such as the economic situation of the enterprise, decrease in efficiency, or insufficiency of the worker. However, the employment contract of a workplace union representative cannot be terminated by the employer unless there is a just cause and the reason is clearly and precisely stated in writing.

The concept of “just cause” refers to “Situations not complying with rules of morality and good faith” listed in Article 25/II of the Labour Law (theft, insulting the employer, endangering work safety, etc.). In other words, the employer cannot dismiss a union representative by saying “your performance has dropped,” “there is surplus staff,” or “the department is closed.” This is an absolute protection.

6.2. Wage Guarantee and Compulsory Employment (Presumption of De Facto Work)

If the representative files a lawsuit within 1 month in case of unfair termination and the court decides that the termination was unfair:

  • The termination is deemed invalid.
  • The employer is obliged to reinstate the representative.
  • If the employer does not reinstate, they cannot get away by paying compensation as with other workers. The Law accepts that the employment relationship continues as long as the representative is not reinstated.
  • Until the representative’s term of office ends (until the election period), all wages, bonuses, and social rights continue to be paid by the employer. Even if the representative sits at home, they receive their salary.
  • This protection continues in case the representative is re-elected.

This regulation makes the employer’s strategy of “I’ll give him his money, I won’t let him into the factory” impossible for representatives. The representative guarantee is one of the rare legal rules that ignore the employer’s will to terminate.

6.3. Prohibition of Change in Working Conditions (“Exile” Prohibition)

Unless there is the consent of the workplace union representative, the employer cannot change the workplace or make essential changes in the job. For example, they cannot move the representative from the day shift to the night shift, send them to a branch far from the central building, or take them from a desk job and give them manual labor. Such changes made without the written consent of the representative are invalid (void).

If the employer acts contrary to this provision (for example, appoints the representative to another city and fires them when they don’t go), compensation not less than 1 year’s wage(can go up to 15 months with CLA) is paid to the representative. This is a vital guarantee introduced to prevent the representative from being detached from the worker mass where they conduct organizational activity.


Question 7: What are the Fundamental Problems and Structural Blockages Encountered in Judicial Practice and Current Events (Polonez, Flormar, etc.)?

There is a distinct gap between the theoretical protection provided by legal legislation and the harsh realities of working life in Turkey. The conflict between the rule of law principle and employers’ “de-unionization strategies” has come to light with resistances that have become public property in recent years and high court decisions.

7.1. De-Unionization via “Objection to Competence” and Warning of the Constitutional Court

The “soft underbelly” of the union system in Turkey is the objections made by employers to the Ministry’s determination that unions have provided the majority required to make a collective labor agreement. Even if employers know that the union has achieved the majority, taking advantage of the judicial process (local court + appeal + Court of Cassation) lasting 3-5 years, they object to the competence determination and dismiss unionized workers during this period, leaving the union in an unauthorized position.

2024 Decision of the Constitutional Court: In its decisions dated 2024 upon the applications of DISK/Birleşik Metal-İş and Nakliyat-İş unions (Application No: 2021/5841 and others), the AYM ruled that failure to conclude objection lawsuits to competence determination within a reasonable time is a violation of the right to organize. Stating that “the legal provisions regulating the competence system create a structural problem,” the Court sent the decision to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) for the correction of the situation. The AYM registered that the current system grants employers a right of malicious objection and makes workers’ constitutional rights de facto unusable.

7.2. Polonez Workers Resistance and the “Code-46” Weapon (2024-2025)

The dismissal of 146 workers at the Polonez food factory in Çatalca, Istanbul, for being members of the Tekgıda-İş union showed how aggressive employers can become when legal protection is insufficient.

  • Use of Code-46: The employer dismissed the workers not for a union reason, but on the grounds of “Abuse of employer’s trust, theft” (Code-46). This code prevents the worker from receiving severance pay, makes it impossible to receive unemployment benefits, and stains their record, making it difficult to find another job.
  • De Facto Resistance and Result: As a result of 6 months of resistance and hunger strike, workers reached an agreement in January 2025 with the mediation of the Ministry of Labour. With the agreement, payment of workers’ severance and notice pay and union compensation ranging from 2 to 7 months was accepted. However, the most fundamental demand of the workers, “reinstatement,” did not occur.
  • Analysis: The Polonez example shows that union compensation has ceased to be a deterrent penalty and has become an “affordable cost” for large capital groups. The employer “bought” a non-union workplace by paying the compensation.

7.3. Global Supply Chain Responsibility: Yves Rocher (Flormar) Case

In cases where domestic legal remedies are blocked or insufficient, global supply chain laws (such as Loi de Vigilance in France) have created a new channel for seeking rights. Flormar workers dismissed for being members of the Petrol-İş union in Turkey filed a lawsuit in France against the French Yves Rocher firm, which holds the majority shares of the company.

  • Development: In the 2024-2025 process, French courts issued interim decisions stating that the parent company could be held responsible for human rights violations in its supplier or subsidiary and initiated compensation processes. This lawsuit constitutes a historical precedent in terms of curbing the anti-union policies of local employers in Turkey due to the brand risk and legal liability created on international parent companies.

7.4. De-Unionization Under the Mask of “Economic Reason” and “Performance”

As frequently seen in Court of Cassation decisions, employers do not make union terminations directly but hide them behind valid termination reasons such as “contraction,” “restructuring,” or “poor performance.” In a Court of Cassation decision given in 2024, it was determined that the employer could not prove the “poor performance” claim with concrete data, on the contrary, hired new workers for the workplace, yet only dismissed the unionized worker, and it was ruled that the termination was union-related. Courts now question the “real purpose” (intention) rather than the “apparent will” of the employer and interpret the presumption of union termination more broadly.


General Evaluation

This comprehensive examination under the title “Protection of Worker Rights in Union Activities in 7 Questions” reveals that union rights in Turkey have a strong structure at the normative level (Constitution, ILO conventions, and Law No. 6356), but a fragile structure in practice.

The main conclusions emerging from the analysis of the report are:

  1. The Gap Between Legislation and Practice: Union compensation being “at least 1 year’s wage” is theoretically a strong sanction. However, employers’ abuse of competence objection processes and the length of trial periods de facto weaken this protection. As seen in the Polonez resistance, employers view compensation as a “cost item” and agree to pay, but persist in not letting the unionized worker into the workplace.
  2. Judicial Gains: The recent Court of Cassation jurisprudence (2023-2024) that union compensation should be exempt from income tax is an important development strengthening workers’ financial rights. Additionally, the AYM’s “competence system must change” decision has registered that the problem is a structural crisis that needs to be solved by the legislative body, not the judiciary.
  3. Proof Problem and Presumption: Although it is difficult for the worker to prove the union reason, the Court of Cassation’s development of “strong indication” criteria (timing, simultaneous dismissal, etc.) tries to balance the scales by shifting the burden of proof to the employer.
  4. Importance of International Dimension: The supremacy of ILO conventions in domestic law and transnational lawsuits as in the Flormar example are the most important external dynamics limiting the arbitrariness of local employers.

Ultimately, the full protection of union rights is possible not only with the perfection of legal texts but with the libertarian interpretation of the judiciary, the organized power of unions, and the effective use of international solidarity networks. If the purpose of labor law is to protect the weak, union guarantees are the most strategic front of this protection.


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